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Abstract  
 
During the 1990s and up to the initial years of the 21st century Neoliberal policies in 
Latin America produced growing levels of poverty and unemployment associated with 
growing crime rates. By combining an historical perspective with social disorganization 
theory this paper aims at analyzing how neighborhood social networks in deprived 
urban areas intervened in this process. The combination of an historical perspective with 
the social disorganization approach (diachronic and synchronic perspectives that have 
usually been treated separately), brings new insights. Firstly, it allows dimensioning the 
changes in forms of internal cohesion in relegated urban enclaves and their association 
with interpersonal violence that have seldom been measured in the Latin American 
context. Secondly, locating social networks and their association with delinquent 
behavior as part of historical process constitutes a revealing test to the traditional tenets 
of social disorganization theory 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many researchers have seen the neoliberal policies applied in Latin America throughout the 1990s and 
up to the initial years of the 21st century as conducing to a dramatic increase in material deprivation, 
specifically in peripheral urban enclaves (Alman and Baer, 2002; Beccaria, 2002; Gudagani, 2002; 
Baab, 2005). In this view, increasing levels of poverty led to more conflictive social ties and greater 
levels of violence among shanty town dwellers (Tonkonoff, 1998; 2000; Duschatzky, 2002; Kessler, 
2002; 2004; Puex, 2003; Bonaldi and Del Cueto, 2009; 2010; Diez, 2009; Auyero, 2012). With only 
few exceptions, in Latin America most of the studies leading to this conclusion have been of a 
qualitative nature,2 hence the extension of this supposed crisis of territorial social ties and their 
association to interpersonal violence has seldom been measured. Using data from a victimization 
survey applied in six argentine cities in 2004, the goal of this article is to estimate the incidence of this 
‘fragmentation’ of territorial social ties in poor urban neighborhoods and their association to a specific 
form of interpersonal violence locally known as ‘street harassment’. That is, a practice developed 
especially in poor urban enclaves by street corner groups of soliciting money to passers-by in a 
threatening way, especially those who are not recognized as ‘belonging’ to that part of the 
neighborhood. This practice, at the same time, results and reproduces the fragmentation of territorial 
social bonds, were trust is only possible among those who hold primary relations among them. All 
those who have no primary acquaintances in a certain area of the neighborhood are exposed to this 
form of harassment when they transit through it, which is also a way to mark and protect the group’s 
own turf. 
                                                 
1 Institute of Geography, History and Social Sciences. University of the State of Buenos Aires, 
dpmiguez@gmail.com  
2 Two exceptions are Villareal and Silva (2006); Reyes et al. (2011).  
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 The design of the study used to measure the levels of fragmentation in territorial social 
networks and their association with this form of neighborhood crime followed, in general, the classical 
social disorganization perspective. In this view, locally based social networks, composed mainly by 
friendship and kingship ties, increase the capacity of neighborhood residents to engage in guardianship 
against predatory victimization. In addition, they exert structural constraints on the deviant behavior of 
local residents.3 This approach proposes that poverty-stricken areas have weaker social ties and 
community organizations, thus creating the conditions for higher victimization rates. 
  Although our study parts from this perspective, certain qualifications must be added in order 
to make it applicable to the Latin American context. One important consideration is that low income 
settlements in Latin America have historically been internally cohesive and organizationally strong, 
partly due to the way in which local political leadership has fostered these forms of organization and 
cohesion. Although some classical ethnographies in the social disorganization perspective have 
considered the role of local politics (Whyte, 1965), generally speaking, quantitative studies in social 
disorganization have seldom taken into account the role of local political leaders and usually treat 
disadvantaged U.S. inner cities as having weak social networks and low levels of internal cohesion.4 In 
contrast with this approach we assume that in Argentina low income settlements have traditionally had 
a strong internal cohesion bolstered by local political organizations and leaderships. However, these 
conditions changed with the deterioration of the economic situation and the alteration of the role of 
traditional political parties and leaders produced by the neoliberal policies of the 1990s.  
Considering this process of change in the neighborhood social structure introduces a further 
difference with the social disorganization perspective. This last approach tends to assume an 
exclusively synchronic view of social networks, which implicitly treats their constitution and roles as 
constant in time. Instead, we conceive that the structure and role of local social networks can only be 
properly understood by situating them as part of an ongoing historical process. Another important issue 
is that, in general, social disorganization studies suppose a lineal causal link where conflictive social 
bonds lead to neighborhood crime. Alternatively we assume that, in the Argentine case, there are 
reciprocal influences between these elements. Hence, while conflictive social bonds favor interpersonal 
violence, episodes of violence reproduce conflictive bonds. Therefore, in addition to measuring the 
presence of conflictive bonds and their association to crime in the argentine case, this paper aims at 
providing some insights to the traditional social disorganization perspective by considering the role of 
politics and historical process.  
 In sum, the central goal of this article is to measure the extension of conflictive social bonds in 
poor urban enclaves and their reciprocal association with a specific form of neighborhood crime named 
street harassment by applying a survey that uses the social disorganization approach as a basic starting 
point. However, the study aims at making a distinct contribution by interpreting the constitution and 
role of social networks as part of ongoing historical process, which differs with the exclusively 
synchronic analysis that usually characterizes the social disorganization perspective. It also seeks to 
transcend conventional social disorganization analysis by looking at the role of local political 
leadership and the reciprocal influences between conflictive networks and neighborhood crime, instead 
of considering only a lineal causal system where conflictive networks cause crime. Consequently, in 
the next section, a general description of the neoliberal policies and their principal effects is provided 
in order to locate the association between social networks and neighborhood crime in their historical 
context. Subsequently, the survey data is presented and interpreted in relation to this context.     
  
                                                 
3 Since the seminal contributions of Clifford Shaw and Henry Mackay, this has been the prevalent point of view 
in social disorganization theory (Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University Press, 1942). 
Robert Sampson and Byron Groves were the first to test rigorously this assumption through quantitative analysis 
‘Community structure and crime: testing social-disorganization theory.’ American Journal of Sociology. 94: 4 
(1989) p. 779. A vast amount of quantitative studies ensued from these initial contributions, discovering that 
social networks played more complex roles. For lack of space, we cannot summarize the debates here, for a 
seminal contribution in this respect see: Christopher Browning, Robert Dietz, Seth Feirberg. Negative Social 
Capital and Urban Crime. A Negotiated Coexistence Perspective. (Paper Nº 7, Ohio State University), 2000.  
4 Andres Villareal and Braulio Silva. ‘Social Cohesion, Criminal Victimization, and Perceived Risk of Crime in 
Brazilian Neighbourhoods.’ Social Forces. 34:3 (2006), p. 1728. 
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Social Conditions and Crime in the Neoliberal Era 
 
Neoliberal economic policies were systematically applied in Latin America after the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ of 1989 and Williamson’s (1990; 1993) political recommendations to supersede the 
economic stagnation Latin America faced during the 1980s (Robinson, 1999; Casilda de Béjar, 2004). 
In Argentina, neoliberalism reigned during the two consecutives presidencies of Menem (1989-1995 / 
1995-1999) who belonged to the Peronista party and continued to a certain extent up to 2002. In 
general terms, neoliberal policies achieved a moderate increase in the GDP, but at a high social cost 
expressed in the growth of poverty, unemployment and inequality (Robinson, 1999:48; Amman and 
Baer, 2002:948; Portes and Hoffman, 2003; Babb, 2005:211). A central feature of these policies was a 
tendency to ‘reform the state’ by privatizing public companies (such as telecommunications, airlines, 
TV and radio stations, petrochemical and steel companies) and also privatizing and reducing the 
quality and extension of public services, such as education, health care and retirement pension 
programs. Also worker’s rights were reduced in order to promote a ‘free labor market’, by removing 
legal restrictions to salary reductions, social benefits and facilitating lay-offs, especially in the public 
sector (Smith, 1991).  
An overall image of the way in which these policies affected the material conditions of the 
population is reflected in the evolution of unemployment and poverty exposed in Figure 1.  We present 
data until 2004, since that is the year when the survey was applied, but also because the years 
2003/2004 represent an inflection point. Unemployment expanded consistently between 1990 and 
2002. As of 2003 unemployment decreased due to an increase in the value of Argentine agricultural 
exports which allowed for a generalized economic growth and the creation of new work positions. 
With regards to the poverty curb, initially it decreased after the hyperinflation years (1989-1991), and 
then a more stable monetary context allowed for a recovery of the relative value of incomes until 1993. 
As of 1993 a new cycle of growing poverty started which ended in an abrupt peak in the new fiscal and 
inflationary crises of 2001-2002. Poverty finally receded with the improving economic conditions and 
social policies applied since 2003.5 Hence, the years prior to the survey represent a moment of dramatic 
increase in poverty and unemployment before a change of tendency between 2003 and 2004. However, 
these changes in the social structure implied more than just a transformation of material conditions. 
 
 
   Source: National Institute for Statistical and Census Information (INDEC) 
 
Although there is not enough space to analyze this here in full, another important change was an 
increasing distrust in politics and political leadership. The Peronist party had traditionally represented 
workers’ rights, especially by promoting social policies and labor laws that in the 1940s and 1950s 
facilitated the social mobility of the working classes. Through this laws and policies, it had set the 
conditions that allowed the working classes to normalize a lifestyle that had the nuclear family, 
                                                 
5 For a more thorough description of this economic trends see Becaria (2002) and Guadagni et al. (2002).  
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education and a strong work ethic as central tenets (Torres and Pastoriza, 2002). This also fostered 
strong territorial solidarity networks within the worker’s neighborhoods and strong union identity in 
the work place (Gené, 2005). Several studies show that the fact that it was the same Peronist party in 
power during the 1990s that instrumented the neoliberal policies that debased these conditions 
produced a profound transformation in the workers’ identities and their forms of solidarity and 
organization (Martuccelli and Svampa, 1997).  This induced a growing distrust in politics and political 
leadership, which also affected local solidarity networks and union activities (Murmis and Feldman, 
2002).   
The following Figure shows that there was, at least, a temporal coincidence between the 
growth of unemployment and poverty and increasing levels of crime.6 Although there is no specific 
data on street harassment, crime against persons and physical injuries are appropriate proximate 
variables since the former include street harassment as one form of crime against persons and the latter 
is a common result of compulsive soliciting. In addition to the ‘temporal’ coincidence shown by 
figures 1 and 2, correlation analysis further reveals that unemployment, poverty and the growth of 
these types of crime were strongly associated. Regretfully, there is no data to diachronically analyze 
how the levels of trust in political leadership may have influenced the growth of these forms of crime. 
However, data from Latinobarómetro7 shows that the levels of trust in political authorities was low at 
least since 1995 and that this discredit was particularly strong between 2001 and 2004. In addition, the 
survey data confirms that low levels of trust in political leaders are associated with a greater probability 
of victimization for street harassment. 
 
 
 Source: National Crime Information System (SNIC). 
 
As stated, the association between poverty, unemployment and crime is confirmed by correlation 
estimates. Crimes against persons correlate in .822 (p=.000) with unemployment, while physical 
injuries have a greater association: .831 (p=.000). Poverty line rates show a less robust association with 
crime against persons and physical injuries (.382, p=.150; .443, p=0.98 respectively) because the 
inflationary periods 1990-1991 and 2002-2003 induced a very volatile behavior of the poverty line 
index. But during the more monetarily stable period 1993-2002, the association was strong and robust: 
.865 (p=.000) for crimes against persons and .906 (p=.000) for physical injuries.8  
                                                 
6 Between 1990 and 2004 crime against persons expanded 245%, while physical injuries —the more prominent 
type of crime against persons— expanded 256%. 
7 Latinobarómetro is an international survey measuring political and social attitudes across several Latin 
American countries, estimates for the 1995-2004 period show that no more than 4 percent of the argentine 
population declared to trust political parties.  
8 Property crimes correlate with unemployment rates in .790 (p=.000) and .898 (p=.001) for the poverty line 
index. 
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 These figures provide an overall image of how during the 1990s and until the initial years of 
the 21st century the increases in poverty and unemployment experienced by argentine society were 
strongly associated with growing levels of crime. However, while these estimates suggest that in a 
context of growing material deprivation crime augmented, they do not reveal the specific mechanisms 
that mediated in this association. Our hypothesis is that, at least partially, the association between 
material deprivation and crime is explained by a growing deterioration of territorial social ties, which 
was particularly strong where poverty and unemployment were more strongly felt, like poor urban 
neighborhoods.9 In addition to material deprivation, the lack of trust in political leaders was also 
associated with more conflictive social bonds and a greater probability of been a victim.   
In order to test these hypotheses we need to change our unit of analysis. Instead of analyzing 
general trends across long time spans, we now turn to survey data that takes individuals nested within 
neighborhood social networks as such units. Regretfully, this introduces several gaps. Survey material 
will not allow us to reconstruct a diachronic perspective as we have presented with respect to 
unemployment and poverty, and it will also show the conditions that increase the possibility of being a 
victim of crime, but it will not provide evidence about their perpetrators. However, even with these 
limitations, the survey study provides relevant evidence to at least make some informed conjunctures 
and hypotheses about how detrimental material conditions and lack of trust in political leaders can 
induce to more conflictive social bonds and neighborhood crime. 
 
The Study 
 
The study consisted in a survey aimed at measuring how certain ecological conditions in different types 
of neighborhood influence in the extension and type of local social networks and their capacity to 
inhibit neighborhood crime. The survey was applied in six Argentine cities: Buenos Aires (2,891,082 
inhabitants) and its metropolitan area (9,910,282), the city of Córdoba (3,304,825), Mendoza 
(848,660), Tucumán (586,198) and Tandil (126,300). Interviews amounted to 800 cases for each city, 
for a total sample of 4800 cases. Since differences between cities were not significant, for parsimony, 
we have not considered variations between cities in this study. 
The sample was representative by social sector in each of the surveyed cities. We used the 
housing level10 to establish the socioeconomic status of the population. Then we established the 
incidence of each housing level in each of the surveyed cities and interviewed a proportional number of 
residents belonging to each level. Interviews were conducted with the head of household (the main 
provider) or his or her spouse by an independent surveyor. Interviewers randomly selected the 
households to be interviewed by choosing one in every three homes on a block until completing the 
correspondent quota in each area. The response rate was high: 96% of the selected head of households 
consented to participate in the survey. Participation in the survey was strictly voluntary and 
confidentiality was assured to all participants.  
The survey considered several types of neighborhood crime, including burglary, personal 
injuries, and assault. It also involved several measures to establish the degrees of internal cohesion in 
each housing level, like the level of trust in local organizations, the police and in local political leaders, 
the extension of familial bonds and the exchange of favors with nearby neighbors, plus we asked about 
the extension of conflictive bonds with proximate neighbors as a sign of weak internal solidarity. Since 
different forms of crime respond very differently to the incidence of political leadership and 
neighborhood networks, due to space limits in this case we restricted our study only to street 
                                                 
99 Di Tella et al., (2006) have shown that in poor urban areas crime rates were 50% higher than average. 
10 The housing level indicator differentiates socioeconomic status according to the type of residence and the 
context in which it is located, it distinguishes six levels: (E) houses made with substandard materials located in 
illegally occupied plots with no city services (shantytowns or villas miseria in Spanish); (D) working class 
houses, old apartments or buildings with two flats without elevators; (C3) low quality houses with two or three 
bedrooms, state housing projects; (C2) small or medium size houses done with good quality materials, medium 
cost apartments with elevators; (C1) flats with amenities or houses in residential areas; (AB) big houses with 
important gardens in expensive residential areas or luxury apartments with amenities.  
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harassment using logistic regression models to measure the incidence of different variables on the 
probability of being a victim of this form of crime.  
 
Variables 
 
Street harassment was measured by asking respondents whether they had been solicited for money in 
the streets of their neighborhood in a compulsory manner in the year prior to the survey. Forms of 
internal solidarity were measured by asking respondents with how many neighbors within five blocks 
of their homes they exchanged favors or participated in common celebrations (like birthdays, 
Christmas, etc.). Similarly, we asked with how many family members within five blocks of their homes 
they exchanged favors or participated in common celebrations. These questions resulted in the family 
social networks and neighborhood social network variables. Conflictive social ties were measured by 
asking respondents with how many neighbors within five blocks of their homes they had had conflicts 
in the year prior to the survey, thus the conflictive social networks variable. The incidence of local 
political leadership was measured asking how much trust respondents had in local politicians.  
We also considered that trust in agents of the security forces could influence in the levels of 
local crime, so we also inquired about the levels of trust in the police. The strength of community 
organizations may also influence in the levels of neighborhood cohesion and affect the probability of 
being a victim of street harassment, so we asked respondents if they trusted local community 
organizations to contribute to the neighborhood wellbeing. In addition to these variables, the survey 
considered the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample such as gender, age, nationality and 
family composition. All variables were dichotomized to improve standard errors and significance 
coefficients. We also nested individual level cases within housing levels in order to consider the 
territorial effect of cohesive or conflictive social networks. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of the study’s sample are described in Table 1, where 
frequencies concerning age, gender, nationality and family composition are exposed. After these 
descriptive statistics, multiple logistic regression models are presented. The first model measures the 
incidence of conflictive social bonds and trust in political leadership in the probability of being a 
victim for street harassment (Table 2). The second model shows the influence of socioeconomic 
conditions, political leadership and street harassment in the constitution of conflictive social bonds 
within deprived urban enclaves (Table 3). We found that, except for the housing level, no other 
variables had a significant effect on the presence or extension of familial or neighborhood social 
networks; thus, we do not present logistic regression models for these cases.  
 
Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
The study’s sample included 2408 (50.1%) females and 2401 (49.9%) males, 3938 (81.9%) were above 
30 years of age, while 871 (18.1%) were below that age group. Foreigners represented a 5.7 % (871) 
and Argentineans a 94.3% (4535) of the sample, while 533 (10.9%) respondents lived in female headed 
households. In addition, 433 (9%) lived in shanty towns, while 4363 (91%) lived in higher housing 
levels (working class, middle class and upper middle/high class neighborhoods). Table 1 shows the 
main demographic characteristics of the sample, comparing shantytown dwellers with the rest of the 
population. It also shows the incidence of the study’s main variables in different housing levels. 
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Shantytowns 
(percentages) 
Other housing 
levels 
(percentages) 
Sex Male 49.7 50 
Female 50.3 50 
Age Below 30 30.7 16.9 
30 or more 69.3 83.1 
Nationality Foreigner 17.6 4.5 
Argentinean 82.4 95.5 
Female headed households Yes 13.6 10.6 
No 86.4 89.4 
Poor by income Yes 57.5 19.1 
No 42.5 80.9 
Trust in community 
organizations 
Trust 98.7 99.3 
Little or no trust 1.3 0.7 
Trust in the police Trust 53.5 42 
Little or no trust 46.5 58 
Trust in politicians Trust 23.9 25.8 
Little or no trust 76.1 74.3 
Family social networks Less than three 63.5 82.9 
Three or more 36.5 17.1 
Neighborhood social networks Less than three 60.3 61.3 
Three or more 39.7 38.7 
Conflictive social networks Less than three 94.2 96.6 
Three or more 5.8 3.4 
Street harassment Non victim 90.8 95 
Victim 9.2 5 
 
Results in Table 1 already provide important information on the extension and incidence of territorial 
social networks and neighborhood crime. Initially, they suggest that quite extended neighborhood and 
family social networks have an important presence in all housing levels.  Almost 40% of respondents 
in all housing levels declared to have three or more neighbors with whom they exchange favors. 
Familial networks have a similar incidence in the lower housing level, although they are less present in 
the rest. Further estimations reveal that if we combined family and neighborhood social networks and 
included cases with two or more contacts, the incidence of social networks would be almost 70% in all 
housing levels. Thus, we may conclude that, in this respect, territorial social cohesion is still quite 
strong in argentine society. Furthermore, results show that the incidence of social networks is equal or 
greater in deprived urban areas as shantytowns. Hence, contrary to what is assumed in social 
disorganization theory, poor urban enclaves seem to be, at least in this respect, equally or more 
cohesive than more accommodated neighborhoods.  
 Another interesting finding is that conflictive social networks have low levels of incidence in 
all housing levels, although it is somewhat higher in shantytowns. A similar thing happens with street 
harassment. It has a relatively low incidence in all social levels, although it is higher in deprived urban 
areas. Hence, this suggests that, consistent with our assumptions, material deprivation is associated 
with more conflictive social networks and more neighborhood crime. However, this is in need of a 
certain qualification. Contrary to what is suggested by most ethnographic studies, interpersonal conflict 
and violence even in marginalized urban enclaves as shantytowns affects only small proportions of the 
population. Although incidents of interpersonal violence may have repercussions beyond those directly 
involved as victims or perpetrators, it is important to bear in mind that not all shantytown dwellers are 
involved or affected in the same measure by conflict and crime. Hence, these data suggests that while 
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poor urban enclaves are characterized by greater incidence of social conflict and crime this does not 
mean a lack of internal cohesion. What this implies is that important levels of cohesion among certain 
members and in certain respects coexist with the presence of rather small groups of neighbors engaged 
in conflictive networks that experiment greater levels of street harassment.  
Located in the context of the historical processes that affected Argentina in the past decades, 
this suggests that the changes in material and political conditions did not completely destitute 
traditional forms of association and solidarity among neighbors, but they probably promoted 
conflictive ties among certain groups where victimization is more frequent. In the next section we 
present the results of the regression models that more specifically tackle these issues. 
 
Political Leadership, conflictive bonds and street harassment 
 
Table 2 shows that being male, under 30 and a foreigner strongly increments the possibility of being a 
victim for street harassment. Holding constant these demographic factors, other elements such as living 
in shantytowns and the levels of trust in the police and political leaders also influence in the probability 
of being a victim for street harassment. In addition, and confirming our previous inference, conflictive 
bonds with proximate neighbors have a strong incidence in the probability of being a victim for this 
form of crime. Hence, independently of other intervening factors, these results confirm our previous 
inference that small groups of neighbors that hold conflictive bonds among each other are significantly 
more exposed to be victims of street harassment.  
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Table 2. Street Harassment 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Constant 3.512* 
(.129) 
3.848** 
(.162) 
3.847* 
(.171) 
Sex 
(male=1) 
.836* 
(.149) 
.800* 
(.150) 
.765* 
(.150) 
Age  
(below 30=1) 
.493** 
(.156) 
.415** 
(.159) 
.369*** 
(.161) 
Nationality 
(foreigner=1) 
.984* 
(.217) 
.843* 
(.228) 
.876* 
(.229) 
Household 
(female headed=1) 
.088 
(.245) 
.072 
(.246) 
.004 
(.248) 
Trust in the police 
(little or no trust=1) 
 .332*** 
(.162) 
.310*** 
(.163) 
Trust in politicians 
(little or no trust=1) 
 .348*** 
(158) 
.371** 
(152) 
Housing level 
(shanty towns=1) 
 .405*** 
(.199) 
.415*** 
(204) 
Trust in community organizations 
(little or no trust=1) 
  .590 
(.641) 
Family social networks 
(three or more contacts=1) 
  -.182 
(.187) 
Friendship social networks 
(three or more contacts =1) 
  -.029 
(.147) 
Conflictive social bonds 
(three or more conflicts=1) 
  .833** 
(.251) 
*p<.000 ; **p < .005; ***p < 0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
Table 2 presents another revealing result. Contradicting the most common assumption in social 
disorganization theory, kinship and neighborhood social networks don’t have a protective effect. 
Relatively extended networks of relatives or friendly neighbors do not reduce the chances of being a 
victim for street harassment. Hence, while holding conflictive relationships with proximate neighbors 
increases the chances of being a victim, holding positive ties with them does not necessarily protect 
from crime.   
While results in Table 2 confirm our main supposition that conflict among neighbors is 
associated to certain forms of neighborhood crime, and that they are especially strong in poor urban 
enclaves, it does not show what may cause conflictive social networks. Table 3 explores the conditions 
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that foster conflictive ties among neighbors. Results show that being a male below 30 increases the 
chances of having conflict with proximate neighbors. Independent of these factors, the levels of trust in 
public agencies such as the police and political leaders has also a net effect on the probability of having 
conflicts with proximate neighbors. Hence, this confirms our assumption that in Argentina the levels of 
trust in political leaders and other state agents such as the police have an important influence in the 
levels of conflicts among neighbors and the probability of being a victim of certain forms of 
neighborhood crime (as shown in Table 2).  
 
 
Table 3: Conflictive Social Networks 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
Constant 3.660** 
(.466) 
4.134* 
(.191) 
Gender  
(male =1) 
 
400** 
(156) 
.466** 
(.163) 
Age  
(Below 30=1) 
449*** 
(179) 
.463*** 
(.179) 
Nationality 
(Foreigner=1) 
-.115 
(.348) 
-.119 
(.349) 
Trust in the Police  
(little or no trust=1) 
 .632* 
(.168) 
Trust in Politicians 
(little or no trust =1) 
 .735* 
(.171) 
Street harassment 
(victim=1) 
 .972* 
(.235) 
Housing level 
(victim=1) 
 .543*** 
(.222) 
*p<.000 ; **p < .005; ***p < 0.05 Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
In addition, results also confirm a reciprocal incidence between street harassment and conflictive social 
networks. While, as we saw in Table 2, conflictive social networks have an influence in the probability 
of being a victim of street harassment, being a victim of this form of crime also influences in the 
chances of having conflicts with close neighbors. Thus, this suggests that causality cannot be 
understood as a lineal incidence of one factor over another, but as a reciprocal system of mutually 
influencing factors. Although there is no space to explore this here, we in fact found that trust in the 
police and in political leaders is also part of a system of mutually influencing elements. While low 
levels of trust in politicians and the police influences in the chances of having conflicts with neighbors 
and being a victim for street harassment, the causal link also functions the other way around. Being a 
victim for street harassment and having conflicts with neighbors reduces the levels of trust in public 
authorities.  
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Conclusion 
 
Results have confirmed that there is a strong association between conflictive social networks, street 
harassment and territorially concentrated material deprivation. However, an important qualification is 
that even in poor urban enclaves these forms of conflict and crime affect only small minorities. Survey 
results reveal a low incidence of conflictive networks and street harassment, hence contrary to what is 
suggested by several ethnographies and social disorganization theory, poor urban enclaves cannot be 
characterized as exclusively dominated by conflict and crime. At least in the Argentine case, conflict 
and crime coexist with quite extended solidarity networks of friendly neighbors and kin that exchange 
favors and engage in common celebrations. Possibly, the long historical tradition of holding cohesive 
territorial social ties has resisted structural change and thus preserves solidarity networks among 
neighbors. However, we have found that even if these cohesive social ties subsist, they do not have a 
preventive effect on street harassment. This possibly contributes to the fact that even if these networks 
are more extended in deprived urban areas, there is still a greater incidence of street harassment in 
those areas since these cohesive social ties are not a protective factor. 
 Another important finding is that respect for political leaders and agents of the security forces 
is also strongly associated with neighborhood conflict and street harassment. This is also in line with 
our supposition that given the traditional role that political parties and state agents have played in the 
constitution of local forms of solidarity, they also have an influence in the levels of cohesion and 
protection from abusive behavior between neighbors. Hence, the lack of trust in these agents produces 
greater levels of conflict and crime. Although this insight stems specifically from the Argentine case, it 
suggests the importance of considering the role of political leadership and public agents and agencies 
when measuring the levels or causes of social disorder. Since many classical ethnographies show that 
also in U.S. inner cities local politics and state agents play a role in the internal structure of social ties, 
adding this dimension in quantitative studies of social disorder seems a good way to advance our 
knowledge of its causes. 
 Finally, we have shown that these causal links do not operate in a lineal manner. The 
association between conflictive social networks and street harassment are reciprocal, hence while those 
involved in conflicts with proximate neighbors are more exposed to crime, those who are victims of 
crime have a greater chance of engaging in conflicts with neighbors. Also, while those who have scarce 
respect for local political leaders and the police are more exposed to conflicts and crime, also those 
who have been victims will more possibly have low trust in local institutional agents. Again, this 
suggests that instead of treating disorder as a state of local social ties resulting from a fixed set of 
causes, it is probably more reasonable to treat it as a complex system of reciprocally influencing 
factors.  
  In sum, we have found that in the Argentine case that although material deprivation is 
associated with neighborhood conflicts and crime, this should not be taken out of proportion. Conflict 
and crime affect small proportions of the population and coexist with important levels of social 
cohesion expressed in the presence of quite extended social networks. In addition we found that 
political leadership and state agents are important factors in explaining the levels of internal cohesion 
or conflict in deprived urban areas. Also, we discovered that these factors reciprocally influence each 
other instead of holding lineal causal relationship. Hence, although social disorganization theory has 
been instrumental in allowing us to produce appropriate measures of the incidence of neighborhood 
conflict and its association with local crime, two additional insights result from our study. The role of 
local politics and state agents should be included as intervening factors since they may have a great say 
in explaining the levels of cohesion and conflict in internal social ties. Also, reciprocal influences 
between factors should be considered before supposing lineal forms of causality. 
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